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ABSTRACT
We report results from experimental markets in which two different qualities of
water are supplied to two types of consumers: households and farmers. In the scena-
rios studied, we vary strategic complexity (and centralization) by varying the number
of agents per market. Centralization of information by a multiproduct monopolist
(scenario 1) improves market performance with respect to a duopoly (scenario 2). A
downstream coordinator (scenario 3) succeeds in mitigating upstream market power.
In a complex setup like ours, some centralization on the supply or the demand side
may enhance market efficiency.
Key words: water quality, experimental market, complex system, centralization,
market efficiency
JEL: C91, D43, L13, L95, Q25
1. INTRODUCTION
Water is necessary for multiple purposes ranging from its use as a consumption
good (potable water and water for recreational activities) to water as a production
factor (industrial usage, energy generation, intrinsic usage to clean up used water).
Interaction of usage is complex, since used water returns in different forms and may
be subject to irreversibility (let alone the problems accruing due to water’s spatial and
temporal dimensions).
Since early debates on market regulation, the management of natural resources
(among which water is usually mentioned as the most necessary for life) has been
considered a task of major economic, ecological and political importance. In most
cases, water management has been undertaken by state or local authorities. However,
in some countries with a strong tradition in decentralized market institutions, the pro-
blem of water scarcity has been tackled with decentralized management by more or
less coordinated economic agents. A usual critique of such solutions is inspired by the
fact that water is a necessary commodity whose accessibility by all should not depend
on market conditions and the fear that market prices might make water a «luxury
good» for low income citizens. This fear is basically founded on two arguments:
First, utility maximization by decentralized agents may be incompatible with global
maximization of welfare. Second, decentralized agents may fail to efficiently deal
with the dynamic aspects of the exploitation of a resource and its distribution across
MIXTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT WATER QUALITIES: 97
AN EXPERIMENT ON VERTICAL STRUCTURE IN A COMPLEX MARKET
1 In the resource management front, a number of interesting issues are dealt with in a series of
experimental papers on natural gas transportation through pipeline networks by Rassenti et al. (1988)
and McCabe et al. (1989).
2 For less complex setups, the existence of vertical relations among markets has been studied in
the laboratory in several occasions. For example, Goodfellow and Plott (1990) and Durham (2000)
report the results from a series of experiments on a simple —in terms of its parametric structure—
setup with two vertically related markets.
different uses, mainly because they lack information on the general functioning of the
system. While the first argument has been extensively studied, controlling for dyna-
mic inefficiencies and learning failures in complex markets has been a far more
demanding task.
In his seminal article, Gordon (1954) showed that complete rent dissipation may
emerge from the exploitation of an open access resource, whereas a single owner of
the resource would be more efficient by internalizing exploitation externalities.
Eswaran and Lewis (1984) established the related result of inverse dependence of
rent accrual and the number of resource extractors. Mason and Phillips (1997) provi-
ded experimental evidence of this relationship for small groups showing that an
increase of the industry size may induce a smaller standing stock of a common
resource. In the context of groundwater, Burt (1964) proved analytically that a mono-
poly induces a more conservative usage of the resource, while perfect competition
would induce depletion of the economic rent.
Up to now, there has been limited experimental research on water resources, but
the few studies undertaken in (rather simple) competitive settings fed the pessimism
that resources may be inefficiently used1. In an experiment with a static setting, Gard-
ner et al. (1997) show that higher efficiency is achieved when a lower number of
extractors exploit a common resource, although the expected non-cooperative equili-
brium values are not supported by the results. In a water pumping game experiment
(with limited entry), Herr et al. (1997) observed that subjects faced with an intertem-
poral problem acted even more myopically and less successfully than in a time-inde-
pendent setting. Their results suggest that the tragedy of the commons arises also in
a world with minimal institutional constraints on behavior, and that myopic behavior
in a time-dependent setting exacerbates this problem.
In all these papers, dynamic and static (in)efficiencies relate to horizontal exter-
nalities due to competition in the extraction of a common resource. However, it is
reasonable to assume that externalities may also arise due to downstream competition
(in the supply or distribution) among firms extracting from independent resources2.
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3 By defining property rights of a resource or more to a sole owner, we concentrate on the effects
which arise from the vertical market structures studied and neglect the ‘public good’ nature of the
resource.
4 Inspired on the practice by many politicians and suggestions by authors like Anderson and
Leal (1989), adopting the formation of coalitions as an efficient method of water management.
5 As used by Saleth et al. (1991) to refer to a market in which there are relatively few agents.
6 Howe et al. (1986), using a much simpler model than ours, offer some justification of our con-
cerns for a solution to a problem of water flow management in the presence of quality considerations
in an upstream-downstream framework.
7 Administration of dynamic flow problems are a famous example of such characteristics, but
the interest in human behavior under alternative market structures has been the most popular in
resource economics, despite the argument by Wong and Eheart (1983) that inefficiency due to imper-
fections in market design and organization can be observed even in the case of simulated (thus, per-
fect) behavior.
Our setup rules out competition in the extraction of the resource3. In the economy
considered here, there are two water sources of different qualities. The demand side
is represented by two different types of consumers: households and farmers. The
water supplied to them may be the result of purification, since households will con-
sume water whose quality exceeds a minimum level. The experimental design focu-
ses on three different levels of strategic complexity (and decentralization), which are
characterized by the number of different types of (human) agents acting in the mar-
ket. We study water allocation in a market where a monopoly (treatment 1), or a duo-
poly (treatment 2), sell water of two different qualities to the consumers. In a third
treatment, the duopoly sells to a monopsonist (downstream coordinator) acting on
behalf of both types of consumers4. Given that in treatments 1 and 2 consumption is
simulated by the computer, treatment 3 is the only one in which human agents act on
both sides of the market (supply and demand). A novel feature of our framework is
that we allow for mixing of different water qualities. This acts as a bridge between
dynamic efficiency of water flow administration, on one hand, and market functio-
ning under heterogeneous market valuations of two goods sold into a «thin»5 market,
on the other. Our interest in such a setting relates to some market features which have
been already dealt with in the literature6, and some of which are rather specific to the
case of water markets7. Among such features, we mention market power, water flow
administration, decentralization (vs. cooperative decision-making aimed at global
efficiency), etc.
Generally speaking, our assumptions concerning consumer utility are qualitati-
vely similar to those in Williams et al. (1986) on multiple commodities which are
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8 See, for example, Gisser and Sánchez (1984) and Rubio and Casino (1999).
9 Which are sub-optimal compared to simulated agents in treatments 1 and 2 who, by design,
act in an individually optimal way. In fact, a vast literature is dedicated to various factors which may
be responsible for observed shortcomings of human behavior in complex environments, like misper-
ception of feedback (Paich and Sterman, 1993, and Sterman,1994), limitations in subjects’ learning
when exposed to strategic complexity (Richards and Hays, 1998), or multi-task decision making
(Kelly, 1995) with asymmetries (García-Gallego and Georgantzís, 2001, and García-Gallego et al.,
2001). A number of factors that favour subjects’ improvement of performance have, also, been iden-
tified. For example, trial-and-error algorithms have been shown to facilitate convergence of the stra-
tegies played by uninformed subjects towards symmetric, full-information equilibrium predictions,
as shown in García-Gallego (1998) for the case of a price-setting oligopoly.
interdependent in consumption. Two further features which are rather specific to the
dynamics of water are added to the structure described so far: First, buyers are res-
tricted to buy up to a certain amount of each type of water, given that their purchases
in each period are used to serve their current needs. Second, a constant inflow
(recharge) comes to increase in each period the stock of water in the basins of each
producer. In fact, following a standard formulation of similar groundwater extraction
problems8, a lower stock implies a higher extraction cost, giving rise to a positive
correlation between each period’s marginal costs and past levels of extraction.
We find that competition on the supply side (treatment 2) results in lower social
welfare as compared to a monopoly (treatment 1). Introducing downstream coordi-
nation (treatment 3) in the duopolistic market increases market competition. The
monopsonist is unable to exercise its market power and the deadweight loss decrea-
ses. Therefore, some centralization (upstream or downstream) is socially desirable
even in the presence of human actions9.
The remaining part of the paper is organized in the following way: section 2 pro-
vides some discussion of the theoretical framework in which we derive the socially
optimal solution. Section 3 describes the experimental design. In section 4 we discuss
the results obtained and, in section 5, we conclude.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM
Due to the obvious difficulties associated with the multiple interactions among
all the socio-economic and environmental aspects of water management, theoretical
hydro-economic models focus only on specific questions. Thus, most of the literatu-
re is based on partial equilibrium analysis.
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Aquifers should be considered as different both from renewable and non-rene-
wable resources, because the recharge does not imply an intrinsic growth rate of the
existing stock but is, generally speaking, exogenously generated. However, if the
extraction rate exceeds the recharge rate, the stock will be exhausted, while, given an
extraction which equals the recharge, a hydro-economic equilibrium emerges, ena-
bling an infinite exploitation. Costs of extraction, which arise from pumping, are
inversely related to the aquifer’s water table.
In our model there are two renewable stocks (aquifers) SH and SL from which
water may be extracted. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the recharge to the
respective basin is deterministic and constant. The inflow to the respective basin is
assumed to cease when the storage capacity of the aquifer is reached. The return flow
of consumed water is assumed to be negligible. Thus, changes in the stocks are due
to extraction and recharge only. Extraction costs are supposed to be twice differen-
tiable functions of quantity and stock size. First derivatives are assumed to be, res-
pectively, positive and negative, whereas second derivatives are positive.
We consider the possibility that the water resources differ in their respective qua-
lities. Quality of water in an aquifer may be lower due to marine intrusion or due to
infiltration of fertilizer from agriculture. Let the qualities be denoted respectively by
QH and QL, where QH > QL >0. The qualities are assumed to be constant over time.
However, there exists the possibility of providing any intermediate quality by mixing
water of the two sources. Mixing quantities KH and KL of the two qualities results in
water whose quality is given by:
KHQH + KLQLQM (KH, KL, QH, QL) = ———————— (1)
KH + KL
Quality of potable water should weakly exceed the constant minimum quality
standard Q
min, where QH > Qmin > QL. Mixed water of quality QM may or may not
satisfy the minimum quality standard, depending on the quantities and the qualities
which are mixed. In any case, any quality may be improved at a cost, which is an
increasing function of the difference between the quality before and after purifica-
tion. Moreover, a given improvement DQ of a lower quality is less costly than the
same improvement performed on a higher quality. Let the initial quality subject to
purification be Q0. The purification cost, denoted by C∆Q(K, DQ, Q0), for a certain
water quantity K=KH+KL , is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
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∂C∆Q ∂2C∆Q ∂C∆Q ∂2C∆Q ∂C∆Q ∂2C∆Q
————> ————> ————> ————> ———— > ———— > 0 (2)
∂K ∂K2 ∂∆q ∂(∆Q)2 ∂Q0
∆Q
∂Q02
∆Q
A centralized knot may exist which co-ordinates the resource flow between the
sources and the consumers. The principal objective of the distribution knot is the cen-
tralization of the decisions about quantity and quality supply and the distribution to
the respective consumers. Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution scheme that opera-
tes in each scenario.
Suppose there are many consumers in the economy whose behavior can be aggre-
gated under one of two types: i) the households (h) and ii) the farmers (F). Consu-
mers differ in their respective preferences regarding the quality of water. Both types
prefer a higher quality of the resource to a lower one. Farmers prefer more quantity
of each product to less. However, households will consume water whose quality
weakly exceeds a minimum standard. If mixed quality does not satisfy this condition
it will be subject to purification. The purification procedure is assumed to be costly
enough that it is not profitable to improve quality above the minimum standard. Hen-
ce, the quality consumed by households will be the maximum between the minimum
quality and the mixed quality. Thus, Q0 = QM and
Q
min – QM, if Qmin > QM∆Q = { 0 , if Q
min ≤ QM
Let the households take the purification cost into account in their utility function
and assume the utility functions Uh=Uh (Kh,QMh) and UF=UF (KF,QMF) (where
Kh=KHh+KLh, and KF=KHF+KLF) of the respective consumer-types to be twice diffe-
rentiable with respect to quantity and mixed quality. Farmers’ utility is increasing in
both arguments, while depending on the purification cost function, the utility func-
tion of households might be increasing in the quantity of low quality only up to a cer-
tain limit. In fact, it will be increasing if mixed quality weakly exceeds the minimum
quality standard. From the assumption of twice differentiability of the utility func-
tions it follows that the sum of the functions is twice differentiable, too. The indirect
social welfare function V(KH,KL) which maximizes consumer surplus for a given
quantity of water can be described as follows:
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10 Indeed, it is a problem which is solvable by means of optimal control theory, where the stocks
are the states and the quantities the control variables.
V (KH, KL) = max Uh (KHh, KLh, QMh; KH, KL) + UF (KHF, KLF, QMF; KH, KL)
KHhh, KLhh
s.t.
(i) KH = KHh + KHF
(ii) KL = KLh + KLF
QH KHh + QL KLh(iii) QMh = —————————— (3)KHh + KLh
QH KHF + QL KLF(iv) QMF = ——————————KHF + KLF
As a benchmark for our experimental results, we are interested in the socially
optimal solution of water supply. Given the assumptions above, we formulate the
program that maximizes social welfare10. Without loss of generality, suppose that
initially the resource stocks are in the natural hydrological equilibrium, i.e. at the
upper bound of the storage capacity. Let , denote, respectively, recharges of each qua-
lity water, and t0 the starting time of extraction. Assume the social rate of discount is
d=1. Thus, the intertemporal objective function is formulated as follows
∞
max ∫ e–δt [V (KHt, KLt) – CHt (KHt, SHt) KHt – CLt (KLt, SLt) KLt] dt
KHt, KLt t0
s.t.
dSHt –KHt + aH, if SH < SHmax(i) ———= {dt SHmax, otherwise (4)
dSLt –KLt + aL, if SL < SLmax(ii) ———= {dt SLmax, otherwise
(iii) SHt0 = SHmax
(iv) SLt0 = SLmax
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11 In each condition, the first two terms, both positive, represent the marginal costs which result
from extracting a quantity KH (respectively KL) from the water stock SH (SL). The third term reflects
the shadow price of the resource, that is, the implied costs induced by a lower water table, which are
imposed on all future extraction.
By means of the resulting current value Hamiltonian and Pontryagin’s maximum
principle (assuming an interior solution) the two following conditions have to be
satisfied in the hydro-economic equilibrium:
∂V ∂CH ∂CH (aH, SH)
——— = aH ——— + CH (aH, SH) – aH ————————∂KH KH = aH ∂KH KH = aH ∂SH
(5)
∂V ∂CL ∂CL (aL, SL)
——— = aL ——— + CL (aL, SL) – aL ————————∂KL KL = aL ∂KL KL = aL ∂SL
These conditions in (5) simultaneously determine the steady-state standing-
stocks of SH and SL. They basically state that, in the long-run, the marginal social uti-
lity, which embodies the respective resource price in the economy, should equal the
social costs of extraction represented on the right hand side11.
3. EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS AND MARKET DESIGN
The experiments were conducted at the Laboratorio de Investigación en Econo-
mía Experimental (LINEEX), at the University of Valencia (Spain). Three treatments
with 14 independent markets (per treatment) were studied in which a total of 84 sub-
jects participated. They were recruited among undergraduate students of Economics
at the University of Valencia. Urs Fischbacher’s software z-Tree 2011 was used for
the programing of the design. An experimental session took between two and two and
a half hours. Subjects earned an average of 3500 ptas ($20).
We use the model described above with the following values for the parameters:
(i) Recharge: (aH, aL) = (3, 3)
(ii) Initial and maximum stock sizes (SH, SL) = (20, 20)
(iii) Water qualities: (QH, QL) = (5, 1)
(iv) Minimum quality standard demanded by the household: Q
min = 3
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12 However, in order to avoid end-game behavior, we stopped sessions after period 35.
13 The quantity limitation was designed to account for the time restrictions of experimental
exposition.
14 Producers in treatment 1 had to post five sealed offers for each product.
The utility and cost functions used are provided in the appendix. Applying the above
equations, in the steady state of the social optimum a stock size of (SH, SL) = (4.84, 5.01)
is obtained associated with the prices (pH, pL) = (102, 86). The quantities (KHh, KLh) = (2.55, 0)
and (KHF, KLF) = (0.45, 3) are assigned, respectively, to household (h) and agricultu-
ral (F) consumptions. Subjects were told that sessions would last 45 periods12.
3.1. Experimental design
The experiment adopted a discrete time framework. No explicit reference was
made to water in the instructions aiming at a no-label experiment. Producer-subjects
knew their product «type», in the sense that they were conscious about a generic pre-
ference by consumers for one good (high quality) over the other. Moreover, they
knew that their products were demand substitutes (though not perfectly) and that their
production cost structures were identical. Subjects received a table with their unit
costs depending on the stock size (see the instructions in the appendix).
Consumers received specific information about the increases in their ‘satisfaction
level’ from each additional unit bought. Experimental subjects (consumers and pro-
ducers) were introduced separately to their tasks and did not know any details about
the restrictions on the other side of the market (the information was provided priva-
tely at any instance on their computer screens). A history window would display all
past outcomes regarding own decisions, quantities, payoffs and market prices. Pro-
ducers and consumers were asked to decide about their respective reservation prices
for each unit of product within the range 1 to 5 (the maximum quantity each one of
them could trade in each period)13. Producers had to post, simultaneously, five sealed
offers which should equal the minimum price at which they were willing to sell the
respective unit14. The offers had to exceed weakly the cost of the corresponding unit,
and offers of subsequent units would have to be non-decreasing. On the demand side,
subjects would have to submit five sealed bids for each product, which had to be non
(monotonically) increasing for subsequent units and, at most as high as the rent that
would arise from one extra unit. The bids should reflect the maximum price at which
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15 We used this mechanism because we were not interested in a systematic Stackelberg market
structure, favoring one of the two markets and the correspondingly consumer type.
consumers were willing to purchase an additional unit. Subjects knew that, after bids
were announced, all units of the same product in a period would be sold at the same
market price (see instructions).
3.2. Market institutions
We aim at comparing three different market structures. Our basic market (treat-
ment 2) is designed to be a fully decentralized structure in which resources are inde-
pendently owned and run and consumers act in an individually optimal (simulated)
way. Two alternative structures are designed in which either upstream (treatment 1)
or downstream (treatment 3) action is coordinated and, in both cases, coordinating
agents are human subjects. The non coordinated part of the market (suppliers) in tre-
atment 3 is also run by human subjects. Therefore, together with upstream and
downstream centralization, other shortcomings of human behavior in dynamically
and strategically complex environments can be analysed.
Treatment 1 involves a monopoly (joint ownership of both sources) in the ups-
tream market, and optimal (simulated) coordination of downstream behavior. One
subject is posting price offers for both water qualities. Given these offers, the maxi-
mal consumer rent is determined in the simulated centralized downstream market:
V(KH,KL) – w´ k, where w denotes the vector of sealed offers and k denotes the vec-
tor of quantities. Thus, the bundle of high quality and low quality water which pro-
duces the highest consumer rent is allocated in the economy, and the corresponding
offers of the subject stablish the clearing prices.
Treatment 2 is our «basic» and least centralized one with which the other two tre-
atments could be directly compared. In this treatment, we assume uncoordinated
action on both sides of the market with a duopoly (decentralized ownership of resour-
ces) selling to two simulated (decentralized) utility-maximizing consumers. Given
the multiplicity of independent agents, further problems in market design had to be
solved. The producer-subjects did not receive information about how markets would
clear and, therefore, they did not know what influence the decisions of the competi-
tor would have on the own demand. Although subjects posted their offers simultane-
ously, markets cleared in a random order determined by the computer15. This mecha-
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16 Since his/her earnings were proportional (50%) to the consumers’ rent.
17 Subjects’ screens would display the maximal satisfaction level associated with the consump-
tion of an additional unit.
nism was introduced aiming at avoiding totally inefficient outcomes in which consu-
mers buy too much of the product which least fits their specific needs. Thus, farmers
were given preference in the low quality market and households were preferred in the
high quality market. Therefore, a consumer was allowed to buy in the ‘other’ market
only if the ‘own’ market was the first to clear and the consumer had been left with
some excess demand.
In treatment 3, three subjects participated in each session. Two of them, the
owners of the sources, acted on the (decentralized) supply side of the market. The
third one, a representative consumer, would be on the (centralized) demand side,
acting as a monopsonist and representing both consumer types16. Like in treatment 2,
a market day comprises a sequence of two, in which the subject who acted as the con-
sumer representative buys subsequently in both markets which opened in a random
order. In the second market, the number of units purchased in the first market, were
taken into account17. The market-clearing is determined by means of comparison
across unit offers and unit bids. In particular, the market-clearing price is the maxi-
min (within the producer’s price offers) exceeded by the maximum price (within the
consumer’s bids), for the same unit, which the consumer were willing to pay. Then,
the quantity would be determined too.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section is organized in three subsections. The first one is dedicated to the
observations concerning stock sizes. In the second subsection, market prices and the
bid-and-offer results are presented and discussed. Finally, in the third subsection, we
undertake the comparison of the three treatments in terms of welfare and efficiency.
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18 Throughout the paper, we use a a=.05 level of significance. We use standard tests from Sie-
gel and Castellan (1988).
4.1. Stock data
In figure 3, the (cummulative) distributions of end-period stock sizes are presen-
ted. Stock sizes below the socially optimal hydrological steady state stock size of (SH,
SL) = (4.84, 5.01) were hardly observed in treatment 1, whereas, in treatments 2 and
3 a few times a high quality stock size of 3 units was reached —which stemmed from
one subject’s strategies in each treatment. Considering the distributions, we see that
each one of the scenarios resulted in a different resource-management. It can be seen
from figure 3 that treatment 1 did not produce any perceivable stock differences
across water qualities. On the other hand, in treatment 2, the low quality stock domi-
nates the high quality one, while in treatment 3 almost the opposite prevails.
Table 1 contains data on the stock sizes in the 14 markets after 35 experimental
periods. A Mann-Whitney test does not reject the hypotheses of stochastic equiva-
lence of last period stock sizes across treatments for low (respectively, high) quali-
ties18. A common feature can be seen in figure 4, in which we observe a declining ten-
dency in (average) stocks during the course of the sessions. However, this trend is
much weaker in treatment 1 (only significant during the first five periods). This
observation is, generally speaking, an indicator of the fact that subjects, in treatment
1, have given priority to the goal of maintaining the hydrological equilibrium of the
system, whereas competing producers, in the other two treatments, have been trying
to sell as many units as possible. In fact, in treatment 3, the decreasing rate at which
this trend is produced indicates that producers have also tried to avoid selling beyond
a certain point leading to stocks which fall too low (so that extraction costs would not
increase to levels implying a serious competitive disadvantage to them).
In any case, the relatively high extraction costs associated with low stock sizes
led subjects in all regimes —on average— to more conservative extraction than
would correspond to the socially optimal steady state solution. In other words, we
obtain the opposite of the common resource overexploitation result attributed to
competition in the extraction stage. That is, the setup studied here results in some
kind of horizontal externality leading to under-exploitation of the resource by firms
who are competitors in the downstream market.
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19 This finding should not be confused with a similar argument by Saliba et al. (1987) concer-
ning prices which do not reflect water values, where value differences are due to water scarcity, etc.
20 In fact, in most of the occasions in which sellers posted a higher price for low quality water
than for high quality one, the corresponding unit of low quality was not sold.
4.2. Posted offers, bids and market prices
Following the theoretical framework, the hypothesis has to be verified that pri-
ces, posted bids and offers should correctly reflect the difference in qualities19. That
is, high quality water is expected to yield higher prices, offers and bids than the low
quality one. However, in a setting like ours, in which human subjects take decisions
in an environment whose market equilibrium is far from obvious, the experimentalist
should not expect this to be a trivial or even a usual result. In fact, the recharge pro-
blem implies a further issue to be taken into account by subjects who should not only
care about what they sell and earn in each period but, also, what this implies for each
product’s stock and, consequently, each producer’s unit costs in future periods.
The most important descriptor of the supply side of our experimental markets,
and also an indicator for the cognitive processes of subjects with respect to beliefs
and learning, is given through the posted offers (since they are the control variables
of producer-subjects). Figure 5 plots the average of the posted offers and bids for the
first unit of each water quality over the 35 periods of the experiment. Table 2 reports,
for each treatment, the posted offers (for the first unit of each quality water) obser-
ved in periods 1 and 35.
In the first period, the monopolist in treatment 1 posted, in all markets, a higher
offer for the first unit of high quality water than for the low quality one. In the same
period, the rest of the units were also offered at prices which correctly reflect quality
differences. In this treatment, the same applies for period 35 and, for the rest of the
periods, only three times (out of seventy possibilities) an inverse order was observed.
Along the 35 periods, and considering all treatments, 155 times (out of 2450) low
quality water was offered at a higher price than high quality one. Given that the only
way for producers of controlling their level of sales was through (very high) offers,
we observe excessively high offers for the last units (mainly, the 4th and 5th). In par-
ticular, the frequency of the event of a higher offer for the low quality is highest for
the fifth unit20. In some cases, subjects were able to increase their sales of high qua-
lity water (selling less low quality’s) by raising offers for the water of low quality.
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Unlike the monopolist in treatment 1, sellers of low quality water in treatments 2
and 3 lack any incentive to post higher offers as a means of promoting the sale of high
quality water. This observation follows text-book theory on monopoly vs. duopoly
pricing in static differentiated product markets, according to which monopolist pri-
cing leads to lower price differences than duopoly pricing does. Focusing on the first
period of each treatment, stochastic equivalence of posted offers for any unit of high
quality and low quality water cannot be rejected by a (pair-wise) U-test in any of tre-
atments 2 and 3. In treatment 2, the low quality producer posted a higher offer for the
1st (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th) unit of his/her product in 8 (8, 7, 7, 6) out of the 14 markets. In
this treatment, offers by the seller of low quality water were, on average, higher than
those posted by the seller of high quality water. In treatment 3, the same is true on
average but, for the 1st (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th) unit, we find only 4 (5, 5, 4, 4) observations
in which the offer posted by the seller of low quality was higher than the correspon-
ding offer posted by the seller of high quality (see table 3).
More specifically, in period 35, the 1st (respectively, 2nd,..., 5th ) offer posted by
the low quality seller exceeded 6 (respectively, 7, 8, 9, 10) times the corresponding
offers posted by the sellers of high quality water in treatment 3 and 1 (respectively,
1, 0, 0, 0) time in treatment 2. During the experiment, the number of times that the
low quality producer posted higher offers (for any unit of his/her product) than the
high quality producer significantly decreased over time in treatment 2 and increased
in treatment 3. A two-tailed Spearman rank correlation test of the null hypothesis of
no correlation of time and the number of observations in which the low quality offer
exceeds the high one is rejected (favoring a positive trend).
In few words, treatments 1 and 2 have reflected better the quality differences on
price offers as compared to treatment 3, in which we observe a tendency towards
equalization of the offers across products. Therefore, subjects who acted as monop-
sonistic distribution knots, have influenced the market outcome in a sense that tends
to distort the expected difference in prices as a result of the difference in qualities.
In treatments 2 and 3, the average offers were lower in the 35th period than in the
first one and low quality producers posted, on average, lower offers than high quality
producers did. In treatment 1, the offers for both products were higher in period 35
than in the first one. In all markets and in all treatments, it is observed that subjects
who submitted in period 1 offers below 100 posted higher offers in the 35th period, and
those who posted offers above 100 posted lower offers in period 35. Look at table 4.
The comparison of posted offers across treatments yields that, in the first period,
the monopolists (treatment 1) posted lower offers than duopolists (treatments 2 and
3). The Mann-Whitney U-test rejects the null hypothesis of equal posted offers in tre-
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21 See, especially, García-Gallego and Georgantzís (2001).
atments 1 and 2 in most occasions, with lower offers in treatment 1. A comparable
result is obtained between treatments 1 and 3 for some units (especially for the sellers
of high quality water). Contrary to what static theory would predict, it is surprising
that, in the duopoly (treatment 2) offers are higher than in the monopoly (treatment 1).
Considering the dynamic nature of the experiment, an interpretation for this appa-
rently odd behavioral pattern is that subjects signal cooperation in the competitive
environment at the beginning of a session, hoping to achieve the collusive outcome
in future periods. In the case of monopoly, subjects approach equilibrium prices from
below as has been already pointed out in other experimental studies21. Finally, it
seems that high first-period offers are rather specific to oligopolists’ strategies aiming
at establishing the collusive outcome. On the contrary, low offers in the first period
seem rather specific to monopolists’ strategies aiming at reaching from below the
initially unknown optimal strategy. A further factor which could favor this kind of
behavior observed in treatment 1 may be found in the priors of our subjects, who
may, initially, apply theories based on real world situations in every new scenario
they face. In this sense, promotion of new products with low prices may be a strategy,
although it seems less reasonable in our context. Moreover, period 1’s posted offers
in treatments 2 and 3 are not stochastically different from each other. However, offers
in period 35 (treatment 3) are lower than in the other treatments, especially those pos-
ted by high quality sellers. The monopsonistic subjects have used their market power
and pushed down the offers posted by sellers of high quality water.
The resulting market-prices reflect what has been stated above: in period 1, prices
of high/low quality water across treatments are stochastically equivalent. Figure 6 pre-
sents a chart of the average prices in the experiment. In treatment 1, the average pri-
ces increase significantly over time (showed by a Spearman rank correlation test). In
treatment 2, the high quality price increases and the low quality price decreases, whi-
le in treatment 3 the contrary happens. However, these observations are not statisti-
cally significant. Prices in treatment 3 are lower than prices in treatments 1 and 2. Spe-
cifically, prices of high quality water in treatment 3 are stochastically dominated by
those of treatment 2 in 25 periods, with increasing importance along the experiment.
On the demand side of the market, in treatment 3, monopsonistic subjects posted
bids for high quality and low quality units (average bids for the first unit are plotted
in figure 5). As would have been expected, subjects use their market power to
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influence market prices through their bids. As can be conjectured from the chart, ave-
rage bids present a non-increasing trend. Moreover, based on individual data, we find
that only in four markets (7, 8, 9, 11) a (significant) decrease of the bids (table 5) is
observed, while, in market 9, this decrease is only observed for the first unit. In the
other three cases (7, 8, 11), market power has been exercised by downstream subjects
who posted very similar bids (negatively correlated with time) for the units along the
session.
Let us look at table 6. Except from the three markets (7, 8, 11) mentioned above,
the correlation between the satisfaction level for one extra unit and the bids is usually
positive and, specially in markets 1, 2, 10 y 14, this relation is significant.
In treatment 3, some subjects (at least 3 out of 14: in markets 2, 10, 14) nearly
equalized the satisfaction levels for one extra unit from their screens, thus, behaving
as in perfect competition. Therefore, the random shocks resulting from sequential
sales were not smoothened by downstream behavior and were transmitted to upstre-
am markets. As a consequence, the levels of satisfaction of the monopsonistic sub-
jects in treatment 3 decrease over time. Yet, in markets 7, 8, and 10 in which subjects
exercised their monopsonistic market power, consumer surplus increased. Figure 7
plots the average payoffs of experimental subjects for each treatment over the hori-
zon of the experiment. Observe that, in treatment 1, monopolists’ average profits pre-
sent a (significant) increasing trend. Table 7 includes data on (average) earnings for
each type of firm (per treatment) and levels of satisfaction of monopsonists. Observe
that the decreasing trend of satisfaction levels for consumers in treatment 3 is signi-
ficant (r
s= –0.38 [–2.39])22.
As far as the quantity of water (of each quality) allocated in each treatment, look
at figure 8. Comparing graphs in this figure, we find that treatment 1 exhibits most
the extraction path which we would assume in the optimal solution, i.e., maximal
production at the beginning, and stabilizing at the hydrological equilibrium (where
extraction equals recharge). Over the 35 periods, an average quantity was supplied
of, respectively, (KL,KH) = (2.8 (1.4); 2.8 (1.2)) in treatment 1, (2.5 (1.3); 2.8 (1.2)) in
treatment 2, and (2.8 (1.6); 3 (1.3)) in treatment 3. Table 8 reports the average quan-
tities allocated in the three markets. No significant trend is found.
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4.3. Market Performance
Let us compare the three treatments in terms of market efficiency. Data on social
welfare averages (aggregated utility minus production costs) are reported in table 9.
At an aggregate level, no significant trend is observed. However, all treatments
present markets in which the level of social welfare (on average) increases (signifi-
cantly) over time (markets 1, 2 in treatment 1; markets 5, 14 in treatment 2; market 8
in treatment 3), as well as markets in which this trend is (significantly) decreasing
(markets 4, 6, 11, 12, 13 in treatment 1; markets 9, 12 in treatment 2; markets 1, 9,
10 in treatment 3). As far as treatment 3 is concerned, observe that markets 7, 8
and 10, even in the presence of monopsonistic power, present levels of ASW that are
below the average social welfare (on aggregate) and, in the case of market 8, as indi-
cated by the Spearman correlation coefficient, average social welfare increases over
time ((r
s= 0.4; (2.51))).
Figure 9 shows average social welfare along the 35 periods. Notice that there is
less volatility in the trajectory of the averages in treatment 1 than in the other two tre-
atments. With respect to treatment 3, since monopsonistic subjects, generally spea-
king, failed to dictate the market, the introduction of an additional subject could have
been responsible for more noise.
An indicator for inefficiency in our hydrological model is the quantity of water
lost because the stock is at its upper limit. Inefficiency arises since resources that
flow into the economy are foregone. From table 10, we perceive that the most
‘saving’ usage, in terms of water management, prevailed under the conditions of tre-
atment 3 and specially for the high quality water (loss equal to 119) .
Moreover, in treatment 3, the recharge rate was more frequently exceeded by the
production than in the other treatments (less number of observations which felt short
of the constant periodical recharge).
5. FINAL REMARKS. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In a series of experimental markets we have tested the performance of three alter-
native ways of administrating the flow and the market for two different water quali-
ties. Some of the results reported above have straightforward implications for econo-
mic policy in the presence of dynamic and strategic complexity.
First, centralization of agent decisions on the supply or the demand side is
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23 A feature which would give some but not full support to the very pessimistic view of psycho-
logists like Brehmer (1980) who claimed that learning is difficult when not impossible unless sub-
jects are exposed to (very simple) linear and deterministic environments.
24 As suggested, among other authors, by Offerman and Sonnemans (1998) and Duffy and Fel-
tovich (1999).
socially desirable. Specifically, centralization of consumer actions mitigates upstre-
am market power and helps internalize the horizontal externality among consumers
and consumer types. In fact, even a market with ideally behaving decentralized
buyers was shown to be dominated in terms of social efficiency by a market with
human (thus, imperfect) agents acting as downstream coordinators. Furthermore, the
introduction of a monopsony tends to equalize prices across product qualities, which
has a direct positive impact on social welfare, because high quality water has been
kept relatively cheap.
Second, contrary to standard wisdom concerning market power in simpler setups,
centralization of decisions by an upstream monopoly also leads to higher levels of
social welfare and a more efficient water management. That is, given that the dyna-
mic aspects of water resource management are important, upstream centralization is
also desirable because it is more likely to guarantee an efficient exploitation of the
resource, and avoid market (price, quantity, profit) volatility.
In fact, our results indicate that volatility in all magnitudes has been higher in the
presence of a larger number of human agents in the market, which seems to support
the view that learning in enhanced in the presence of a more reliable feedback which
is more likely to be received when subjects act in a more stable environment23. Fur-
thermore, the shock introduced by the market clearing mechanism in treatment 2 does
not seem to have been a serious obstacle for learning, given that price offers posted
by subjects tend to stabilize over time, despite the volatility in the quantities sold and
payoffs earned. Together with the remark on the reliability of the feedback, this
observation leads us to the conclusion that strategic complexity is a more serious pro-
blem for humans learning in unknown environments than are moderate stochastic
shocks. A further remark supporting this conclusion is that buyer subjects’ strategies
present the highest volatility among all data obtained. To the aforementioned short-
comings in our subjects’ learning, we have to add the fact that subjects of this type
are «unique» in each session and any imitation of successful subjects of the same or
similar types is impossible24.
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25 Often mentioned as a solution to a huge variety of resource-related problems like, for exam-
ple, in Colby et al. (1993).
Comparison of water flow management across treatments, indicates that consu-
mer coordination has led to a lower waste of the resource than any other of the mar-
ket structures studied, although a constantly declining trend of the stocks indicates
that in a longer experiment this scenario is the most likely to cause a problem of shor-
tage. In fact, this can also be concluded from the fact that, in this treatment, sales abo-
ve the recharge rate were observed more often than in any other treatment. However,
in all treatments, average productions have been almost as much (ranging from
slightly lower to equal) as natural inflow, which suggests that the majority of our sub-
jects have managed to keep the system close to its hydrological equilibrium
(inflow=sales). This also indicates that the dynamic factor has played an important
role in subjects’ actions. The consumption of high quality water exceeded on avera-
ge the consumption of low quality water in all treatments.
Regarding the usual problems in resource extraction games, depletion of the
resource does not appear to be an important issue, because the cost structure preven-
ted subjects from sailing too much in each period. However, we found that, even in
a deterministic environment in which one agent managed two resource stocks under
optimal demand conditions, a non-trivial allocation problem arises, since the mono-
polistic subjects needed to improve (along time) their performance . The lesson that
we draw from our experiment is that an appropriate definition of property rights25
may be not enough for an efficient management of resource markets.
6. APPENDIX
6.1. Utility and cost functions used in the experiment
The household’s utility is given by the following function:
Uh (KHh, KLh, QMh) = 20.5 · ln[1 + (max{Qmin, QMh} + (KLh + KHh)) · (KLH + KHh) – C∆Qh]
where the last term in brackets denotes the purification costs:
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∆Qh2
———(QMh2 + (KHh + KLh)2), if Qmin > QMhC∆Qh (KHh, KLh, QMh) = { 3
0, otherwise
The farmer’s utility function is as follows:
UF (KHF, KLF, QMF) = 1.7 · ln[1 + 0.5 · (QMF + 3 · (KLF + KHF)) · (KLF + KHF)]
The cost function of producer i (i = H, L) is given by:
Kj Si – xi
– ———
Ci (Ki) = ∫ e 2 dxi
0
Thus, the following utils (unit utilities) for high quality and low quality were
assigned to the household (h) and the farmer (F):
household Low   0 1 2 3 4 5
High    0 0 174 301 356 378 378
1 399 492 579 637 679 711
2 555 624 690 753 797 832
3 660 717 771 822 869 906
4 740 789 836 880 920 959
5 806 849 890 929 965 999
Farmer Low   0 1 2 3 4 5
High   0 0 187 354 471 560 631
1 274 391 491 572 639 696
2 422 509 584 647 702 749
3 525 594 655 707 753 794
4 604 662 712 757 798 834
5 668 717 761 801 836 869
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26 In bold, we add some details that might help the reader to understand the experimental sessions.
6.2. Instructions26
6.2.1. Producers
The goal of this experiment is the study of decision-making in experimental mar-
kets. The decisions you’ll make are directly related to your monetary reward. At the
end of the session, you will be paid privately in cash. You can make any questions
regarding these instructions by raising your hand. Any communication is strictly for-
bidden and it will be penalized with the immediate exclusion of the experiment.
The Experiment
For 45 rounds, you are going to participate in a Market Experiment with the follo-
wing characteristics:
1. You take part on a market in which there are two consumers (represented by
one single agent in treatment 2) and two producers. Producers compete to sell their
production and you are one of them.
2. Two commodities (good 1 and good 2) which are demand substitutes (but are
not identical), are supplied in the market (each one supplied by one producer). Both
producers have similar costs structures. The computer will tell you which of the two
producers you are.
3. Although consumers have different tastes, they both prefer good 2 to good 1.
You have to decide about the minimum selling price for each unit of your pro-
duct. To do that, you may use the following information:
1. The table bellow shows the production costs per unit of your product (using
ECUs as our Experimental Currency Unit).
2. Using the information included in the table, you have to announce five (mini-
mum) prices at which you are willing to sell your units (afterwards, you will sell a
maximum of 5 units).
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3. Pricing schemes for the 5ht unit bundle cannot be decreasing monotonically:
the price for the first unit must not be higher than the price for the second unit; the
second unit price must not be higher than the third unit price, and so on.
4. The unit cost decreases with the stock size. Your initial stock size is 20 units and
you will get, every round, three more units. Your stock can never exceed 20 units and,
therefore, any additional (over 20) units you may receive are immediately vanished.
An example: Imagine you are at the beginning of a round with a stock of 10 units of
product and you get your additional 3 units (as you will at the beginning of each round),
so your stock now is 13 units. Your unit costs for the units you produce are the following:
The cost of the first unit produced is 2 ECUs,
the cost of the second unit produced is 2 ECUs,
the cost of the third unit produced is 4 ECUs,
the cost of the fourth unit you produced is 7 ECUs,
and, finally, the cost of the fifth unit produced is 11 ECUs
In order to earn money, your pricing schedules must be such that each unit’s pri-
ce exceeds the corresponding cost. Following the example, the lowest profitable price
for your first unit should not lie below 2 ECUs (its unit cost), etc., nor should it exce-
ed the price you fix for the second unit. These rules also apply for the rest of the units.
If you sell 5 units, your stock size, in the following round, would be 11 units (8
you kept plus 3 you get in the new round). If you don’t sell any unit after your
announcing price scheme, your stock would be 16 units (13 you had plus 3 you get).
Decision making and earnings
1. You have to fill in the boxes that appear at your computer screen with the
minimum prices at which you are willing to sell your units. In each box, you will also
get information about each unit cost.
Stock size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unit Cost 607 368 223 135 82 50 30 18 11 7
Stock Size 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Unit Cost 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
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2. Both producers decide on prices simultaneously and, as a consequence, infor-
mation about the other producer’s decisions will be available only after the round is
over.
3. Although you have to propose five different minimum prices, all units will be
sold at the same price: the highest unit price proposed (by a producer) which is exce-
eded by the correspondent bid proposed by the buyer (which reflects his willingness
to pay). In this way, it is also possible to know the number of units sold (all units with
a price offer higher than the proposed consumer bid).
4. The money you will earn at the end of the experiment will be the sum of the
earnings you get in each round. The exchange rate is 10 ECU = 3 ptas.
6.2.2. Representative Consumer (only treatment 3)
The goal of this experiment is the study of decision-making in experimental mar-
kets. The decisions you’ll make are directly related to your monetary reward. At the
end of the session, you will be paid privately in cash. You can make any questions
regarding these instructions by raising your hand. Any communication is strictly for-
bidden and it will be penalized with the immediate exclusion of the experiment.
The Experiment
For 45 rounds, you are going to participate in a Market Experiment with the
following characteristics:
1. In the market, there are one consumer representative and two producers. The
producers compete to sell their production and you are the consumer representative.
2. Two commodities (good 1 and good 2) which are demand substitutes (but are
not identical), are supplied in the market (each one supplied by one producer). Both
producers have similar costs structures.
3. Your are the representative of all potential consumers in the market. All you
know about consumers preferences is that they prefer good 1 to good 2.
4. The table bellow includes levels of satisfaction (measured in ECUs, an Expe-
rimental Currency Unit) for any combination of commodities you can buy. Your ear-
nings, at the end of each round, will be exactly the difference between your satisfac-
tion level and your expenditure.
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You have to decide on your reservation price (i.e. the highest amount of money
you are willing to pay for each unit of product) for five units of each product. To do
that, you may use the following facts:
a) The reservation price schedule you submit in each round should be not mono-
tonically increasing. That is, the highest price you are willing to pay for the second
unit of any good must not be higher than the highest price you are willing to pay for
the first unit of the same product, and so on and so forth.
b) Each round, your real consumption will be restricted to a maximum of 5 units
of each product.
Decision making and earnings
1. Introduce (in the computer) your decisions about reservation prices and be
careful to use the appropriate boxes. In a round, all units of the same product are sold
at the same price: the maximin (the highest of the minimum prices which results from
the producer’s willingness to accept) which lies below some (highest) price which
commes from your willingness to pay. This way, the number of units that are sold in
the market is directly determined.
2. Every time you choose the highest price you are willing to pay for each unit of
product, you will get specific information about the incremental value on the utility
got by the consumers you represent.
3. In each round, although you have to propose five different reservation prices,
all units of the same product are sold at the same market price: the highest price offer
which is exceeded by your corresponding bid. Since this unit is the last one the pro-
ducer is willing to sell (and you to buy), this unit is the last unit sold in the market.
4. Your earnings will be the difference between the value got from the consump-
tion (the value reflected in the table) and the expenditure in purchasing the units.
Good1/Good2 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 187 361 528 655 772
1 399 586 753 870 963 1052
2 673 790 909 1026 1115 1186
3 829 946 1046 1131 1220 1291
4 977 1064 1151 1232 1300 1371
5 1082 1169 1244 1312 1379 1437
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An example: Look at the table above. If, in the previous round, you bought 2 units
of good 2, your potential earnings, as a function of the units of good 1 you buy (see
the correspondent column), are:
If you buy no units of good 1 consumers get a utility value of 361 ECUs,
if you buy 1 unit of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 753 ECUs,
if you buy 2 units of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 909 ECUs,
if you buy 3 units of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 1046 ECUs,
if you buy 4 units of good 1, consumers get a utility value of 1151 ECUs,
and, finally, if you buy 5 units of good 2: consumers get a utility value of 1244 ECUs.
5. In the interface of your computer, you will find boxes in which you have to
write your bids for each unit of product. You also find the utility value got with the
purchase. For example, if you prefer to buy one unit of product 1 rather than none,
the increase in the utility value you got is 392 ECUs (the difference between 753 and
361).
Your net payment will be half of consumer earnings. The exchange rate is 10
ECUs=3 ptas.
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Figure 1. Water distribution structure in treatments 1 and 3
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Figure 2. Water distribution structure in treatment 2
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Figure 3. End-period stock: cummulative distribution for the three treatments. Vertical axis:
percentage of the total stock; horizontal axis: interval of stocks
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Figure 4. Average stock sizes (treatments 1-3)
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Figure 5. End-period stock: cummulative distribution for the three treatments. Vertical axis:
percentage of the total stock; horizontal axis: interval of stocks
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
1 6 11 16 21 26 31
wL1
wH1
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
1 6 11 16 21 26 31
wL2
wH2
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
1 6 11 16 21 26 31
wL3
wH3
bL3
bH3
MIXTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT WATER QUALITIES: 127
AN EXPERIMENT ON VERTICAL STRUCTURE IN A COMPLEX MARKET
Figure 6. Average clearing prices for low/high quality water (treatments1-3)
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Figure 7. Average payoffs (treatments 1-3)
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Figure 8. Average quantity sold of each quality (treatments 1-3)
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Figure 9. Average Social Welfare (treatments 1-3)
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9. TABLES
Table 1. Stock sizes (Low/High quality) in treatments 1-3 after 35 periods
Market SL1 SH1 SL2 SH2 SL3 SH3
1 15 16 17 6 9 11
2 18 19 11 5 9 13
3 9 13 17 4 15 14
4 9 11 6 10 9 16
5 18 16 11 13 20 15
6 19 19 18 15 6 12
7 5 8 17 7 7 10
8 8 9 14 15 10 5
9 11 9 7 5 4 8
10 18 7 11 17 4 5
11 6 4 11 11 13 13
12 11 11 5 4 20 15
13 18 17 15 12 20 13
14 10 9 17 8 17 4
Av. 12.5 12 12.6 9.4 11.6 11
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Table 2. First unit posted offers (w) in periods 1and 35 (treatments 1-3). Consumers’ posted
bids (b) (treatment 3).
Period Sess wL1 wH1 wL2 wH2 wL3 wH3 bL3 bH3
1 2 3 30 5 1 10 55 300
2 300 300 11 5 4 10 82 380
3 20 25 450 100 3 25 40 300
4 8 18 975 300 5 10 40 260
5 20 30 5 450 15 20 65 270
6 2 5 900 10 12 400 125 200
1 7 10 60 25 10 330 500 186 375
8 3 4 2 350 15 300 150 250
9 3 5 50 5 1 75 70 300
10 3 4 6 400 300 125 115 350
11 1 3 20 10 1000 300 187 363
12 5 8 10 50 10 10 100 260
13 20 80 35 60 400 10 175 350
14 4 8 200 300 607 10 150 385
wL1 wH1 wL2 wH2 wL3 wH3 bL3 bH3
1 72 92 90 150 30 65 117 399
2 165 385 60 65 60 95 84 396
3 65 150 60 75 65 80 47 350
4 80 100 65 100 60 100 65 250
5 95 110 60 99 120 65 85 388
6 75 95 100 130 30 75 80 215
35 7 70 86 80 150 77 51 89 79
8 50 80 86 100 50 49 80 100
9 82 93 85 90 50 99 105 200
10 66 81 115 395 68 40 180 341
11 85 90 75 100 25 18 25 25
12 79 94 25 50 110 140 65 340
13 85 90 75 120 70 74 50 325
14 85 100 100 99 55 50 82 391
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Table 3. Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs) and t-test of time dependence of ‘dise-
quilibrium’ offers (i.e., wL>wH)
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w1 w2 w3 w4 W5
rs -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7
t -1.4 -2.4* -1.3 -0.4 1.4 -6.3* -7.7* -5.7* -5.2*-5.9* 4.3* 3.1* 3.1* 4.7* 5.3*
Note: H0: rs[t,#( wL>wH)]=0
*: rejection of H0 at a=.05-level of significance (|t|>2.04)
-: the minus sign indicates negative correlation
Table 4. U statistics of pairwise comparison between posted offers (treatments 1-3)
period 1 period 35
T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3 T1-T2 T1-T3 T2-T3
Low w1 40.5* 67.5 81 96.5 44** 81
w2 43* 68 83 93,5 65 7.5
w3 47* 44.5* 82 94 90 59
w4 51* 78.5 82 89.5 86 83.5
w5 43* 80.5 75 86 72 72
High w1 52.5* 49.5* 93.5 81 40** 67.5
w2 56.5 53* 92 80 38.5** 29**
w3 56.5 61 87 47.5* 39** 14.5**
w4 55* 57 87 45* 47** 10.5**
w5 53* 61 85.5 46* 58.5 16.5**
Note: Note: The expected value of the U-statistic is 98.
H0: equivalent distributions of offers across treatments.
* (**): Rejection of H0 in favour of the alternative of higher offers in the latter* (former**) treat-
ment (α=.05; U<55)
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Table 5. Spearman rank (rs ) correlation coefficient and t-test of posted bids (b) and time
(treatment 3)
market b1[L] b2[L] b3[L] b4[L] b5[L] b1[H] b2[H] b3[H] b4[H] b5[H]
1 rs 0.67 0.53 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.62 0.09 -0.21 -0.16 0.04
t 5.19* 3.58* 2.26* 2.05* 2.48* 4.56* 0.49 -1.26 -0.93 0.24
2 rs 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.32 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.17 0.24
t 3.02* 2.81* 2.27* 1.91 2.23* 1.45 1.54 1.78 0.98 1.45
3 rs 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.31 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03
t 0.95 0.84 1.02 0.80 0.60 1.86 -0.19 -0.32 -0.14 -0.16
4 rs 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.42 0.51 0.05 0.11 0.41 0.38 0.61
t 1.61 1.80 2.18* 2.69* 3.39* 0.31 0.61 2.56* 2.33* 4.47*
5 rs 0.45 0.49 0.35 0.23 0.15 0.49 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.20
t 2.93* 3.20* 2.12* 1.35* 0.89 3.21* 1.44 0.90 1.29 1.15
6 rs 0.40 0.45 0.51 0.65 0.68 -0.21 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.38
t 2.53* 2.87* 3.44* 4.98* 5.38* -1.26 0.61 0.70 0.43 2.36*
7 rs -0.21 -0.20 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.51 -0.46 -0.44 -0.37 -0.32
t -1.25 -1.17 -0.59 -0.46 -0.14 -3.43* -2.99* -2.82* -2.30* -1.92
8 rs -0.40 -0.35 -0.35 -0.21 0.02 -0.72 -0.75 -0.73 -0.62 -0.26
t -2.47* -2.16* -2.14* -1.22 0.10 -5.94* -6.48* -6.12* -4.51* -1.52
9 rs 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.31 -0.75 -0.33 -0.09 0.05 0.06
t 2.36* 2.28* 2.22* 2.75* 1.84 -6.52* -1.98 -0.49 0.29 0.37
10 rs 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.23 0.23 0.09 -0.10 -0.14
t 4.66* 4.00* 4.32* 4.16* 4.14* 1.34 1.35 0.54 -0.57 -0.78
11 rs -0.77 -0.78 -0.74 -0.57 -0.24 -0.85 -0.88 -0.89 -0.86 -0.37
t -6.97* -7.05* -6.32* -4.00* -1.39 -9.33* -10.82* -11.38* -9.49* -2.31*
12 rs -0.14 -0.16 -0.06 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.23
t -0.81 -0.93 -0.37 1.33 0.52 0.68 1.60 1.05 1.64 1.36
13 rs -0.14 -0.16 -0.06 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.23
t -0.81 -0.93 -0.37 1.33 0.52 0.68 1.60 1.05 1.64 1.36
14 rs 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.33 0.46 0.21 0.36
t 0.74 0.81 1.12 1.14 1.10 1.55 2.03* 3.01* 1.22 2.18*
Agre- rs 0.03 0.089 0.071 0.076 0.141 -0.41 -0.34 -0.46 -0.33 -0.2
gate t 0.174 0.514 0.41 0.439 0.818 -2.6* -2.07* -2.94* -2.02 -1.2
Note: H0: rs[t,b(.)]=0
*: rejection of H0 at a=.05 level of significance (|t|>2.04)
-: the minus sign indicates negative correlation
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Table 6. Spearman rank (rs ) correlation coefficient and t-test of posted bids (b) with consu-
mer’s unit satisfaction level (for one extra unit) which was displayed on the subject’s screen
(treatment 3).
market b1[L] b2[L] b3[L] b4[L] b5[L] b1[H] b2[H] b3[H] b4[H] b5[H]
1 rs 0.47 0.21 0.50 0.55 0.24 0.19 0.20 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04
t 3.04* 1.24 3.31* 3.81* 1.45 1.13 1.19 -0.62 -0.51 -0.21
2 rs 0.77 0.83 0.47 0.51 0.45 0.90 0.94 0.89 0.69 0.76
t 7.03* 8.46* 3.07* 3.40* 2.93* 11.76* 15.64* 11.02* 5.44* 6.69*
3 rs 0.34 0.17 0.08 0.07 -0.20 -0.05 0.35 0.16 0.22 -0.05
t 2.05* 0.97 0.47 0.40 -1.17 -0.31 2.16* 0.96 1.31 -0.31
4 rs -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.14 0.33 0.43 0.23 0.37
t -0.11 0.33 0.10 0.52 0.50 -0.78 2.02* 2.72* 1.35 2.28*
5 rs 0.63 0.35 0.19 -0.17 -0.20 0.15 0.88 0.24 0.00 -0.06
t 4.63* 2.13* 1.14 -0.96 -1.18 0.84 10.41* 1.39 -0.01 -0.33
6 rs 0.14 0.26 0.21 0.31 0.75 -0.37 0.44 0.44 0.32 0.30
t 0.80 1.53 1.26 1.87 6.56* -2.27* 2.85* 2.78* 1.92 1.83
7 rs -0.18 -0.41 -0.41 -0.33 -0.25 -0.26 -0.36 -0.18 -0.11 -0.25
t -1.03 -2.56* -2.55* -2.02* -1.48 -1.54 -2.23* -1.05 -0.61 -1.48
8 rs -0.43 -0.41 -0.44 -0.44 -0.24 0.09 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.45
t -2.76* -2.61* -2.83* -2.83* -1.42 0.52 0.18 -0.47 -0.19 -2.86*
9 rs 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.36 0.11 0.33 -0.24 0.19 -0.05 0.06
t 1.30 1.17 1.06 2.19* 0.65 2.03* -1.41 1.13 -0.29 0.35
10 rs 0.54 0.27 0.55 0.47 0.62 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.23 0.41
t 3.65* 1.61 3.74* 3.05* 4.50* -0.04 0.11 -0.25 1.37 2.59*
11 rs -0.74 -0.67 -0.66 -0.66 -0.38 -0.68 -0.63 -0.56 -0.55 -0.36
t -6.24* -5.16* -5.08* -5.10* -2.34* -5.33* -4.61* -3.91* -3.79* -2.24*
12 rs -0.01 0.00 0.26 0.72 0.44 0.12 0.29 0.30 0.57 0.18
t -0.07 0.01 1.55 5.88* 2.85* 0.71 1.77 1.78 4.01* 1.06
13 rs 0.26 0.10 0.08 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.32 0.04
t 1.52 0.57 0.46 1.46 0.00 0.41 0.75 -0.34 1.94 0.21
14 rs 0.64 0.75 0.82 0.68 0.78 0.91 0.64 0.96 0.70 0.44
t 4.79* 6.43* 8.31* 5.39* 7.12* 12.53* 4.84* 19.39* 5.57* 2.85*
Note: H0: rs[b(.), u’(.)]=0
*:rejection of H0 at a=.05 level of significance (|t|>2.04)
-: the minus sign indicates negative correlation
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Table 7. Average profits for each type of firm and each water quality (treatments 1-3), and
levels of satisfaction (on average) for the monopsonist (C3) in treatment 3. Spearman-rank (rs )
correlation coefficient and t-test of time dependence for subjects’ payoffs
Treat. Market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Tr.1 Av. P tot. 456 538 476 485 502 261 476 405 422 408 199 438 450 505
rs 0.18 0.68 0.15 0.51 0.51 0.03 -0.30 0.53 0.76 0.62 0.80 0.63 0.58 0.70
t 1.06 5.28* 0.87 3.38* 3.39* 0.16 -1.50 3.59* 6.64* 4.48* 7.64* 4.63* 4.07* 5.63*
Av. P (L1) 196 222 188 210 209 113 188 185 188 168 109 196 193 228
rs 0.12 0.85 0.01 0.37 0.28 0 -0.30 0.33 0.60 0.40 0.73 0.52 0.29 0.50
t 0.69 9.31* 0.08 2.3* 1.68 -0.20 -1.50 2.03 4.35* 2.52* 6.07* 3.53* 1.74* 3.36*
Av. P (H1) 260 316 288 275 293 148 288 220 234 240 89.9 242 257 277
rs 0.22 0.28 0.08 0.32 0.16 0.24 0.27 0.47 0.70 0.48 0.76 0.32 0.25 0.38
t 1.30 1.65 0.45 1.92 0.93 1.45 1.58 3.05* 5.57* 3.18* 6.76* 1.96 1.49 2.36*
Tr. 2   Av. P (L2) 177 316 170 184 208 160 166 261 206 271 211 120 216 194
rs 0.12 0.29 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.29 0.07 -0.4 0.61 0.13 -0.3 0.07 0.30
t 0.69 1.74 1.12 0.72 0.95 0.83 1.73 0.40 -2.5* 4.42* 0.74 -1.6 0.38 1.82
Av. P (H2) 321 170 347 355 325 380 315 347 195 298 282 156 338 309
rs -0.20 0 -0.40 -0.20 0.19 0.34 0.07 0.56 -0.20 0.61 0.65 -0.40 0 0
t -1.20 -0.20 -2.2* -1.30 1.08 2.08* 0.40 3.83* -1.10 4.39* 4.92* -2.40 -0.10 -0.30
Tr. 3 Av. P (L3) 101 142 202 134 199 183 211 148 142 154 79.5 241 197 268
rs 0.34 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.43 -0.10 0 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.26
t 2.07* 1.18 1.22 1.59 1.13 1.4 0.57 2.77* -0.50 -0.20 0.10 0.81 0.65 1.57
Av. P (H3) 212 288 237 232 249 222 204 174 329 207 166 286 231 143
rs -0.10 0.28 0.02 0.53 0.25 0.47 -0.10 -0.40 -0.30 -0.40 -0.70 0.57 0.28 0.63
t -0.30 1.70 0.12 3.57* 1.50 3.05* -0.60 -2.4* -1.70 -2.7* -5.4* 4.02* 1.68 4.68*
Av. P (C3) 746 631 660 656 581 717 579 731 628 608 517 558 587 595
rs -0.59 -0.29 0.02 -0.71 -0.28 -0.57 0.25 0.56 -0.45 -0.14 0.25 -0.36 0.20 -0.48
t -4.23* -1.77 0.13 -5.8* -1.65 -3.95* 1.51 3.92* -2.89*-0.83 1.46 -2.22* 1.19 -3.17*
Note: The null hypothesis is H0: rs[t, πi(t)]=0. The asterisk (*) represents a rejection of H0 at α=.05
level of significance (|t|>2.04). The sign (-) indicates negative correlation
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Table 9. Average social welfare (ASW) in each market and on aggregate. Spearman-rank correla-
tion coefficient (rs) and t-test of time dependence of social welfare in each market (treatments 1-3)
Treat- Market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Av.
ment
1 ASW 942 674 1053 1140 1070 692 1105 1115 1123 1117 1009 1146 1082 1164 1031
rs 0.50 0.54 0.05 -0.41 0.03 -0.36 0.16 -0.33 -0.03 -0.18 -0.68 -0.53 -0.53 -0.08 -0.1
t 3.31* 3.68* 0.27 -2.61* 0.18 -2.23* 0.93 -1.98 -0.19 -1.06 -5.30*-3.59*-3.56* -0.45 -0.59
2 ASW 995 923 1027 1058 1058 1006 994 839 1021 773 1102 919 1072 1014 986
rs -0.02 -0.11 0.33 -0.01 0.77 -0.27 -0.20 0.16 -0.88 0.11 -0.06 -0.59 0.30 0.38 -0.07
t -0.10 -0.64 2.01 -0.08 6.96* -1.64 -1.19 0.96 -10.39* 0.63 -0.34 -4.21* 1.78 2.33* -0.4
3 ASW 1059 1061 1098 1022 1029 1122 994 1053 1100 969 762 1085 1016 1006 1075
rs -0.56 -0.27 -0.03 -0.23 0.15 -0.17 0.16 0.40 -0.61 -0.37 0.01 -0.15 0.25 -0.28 -0.27
t -3.86* -1.60 -0.18 -1.36 0.87 -0.98 0.94 2.51* -4.37*-2.26* 0.07 -0.85 1.48 -1.66 -1.63
Note: The null hypothesis is H0: rs[t, SW(t)]=0. The asterisk (*) represents a rejection of H0 at α=.05
level of significance (|t|>2.04). The sign (-) indicates negative correlation
Table 8. Average allocated quantity of each water quality (treatments 1-3)
Market KL1 KH1 KL2 KH2 KL3 KH3
1 2.23 2.26 1.71 3.17 3.23 3.17
2 1.49 1.09 2.09 3.34 3.23 3.14
3 2.77 2.91 1.89 3.29 2.91 3.03
4 3.23 3.17 2.89 3.03 3.23 2.83
5 2.60 2.80 2.69 2.80 1.94 3
6 1.46 1.40 1.77 2.91 3.29 3.09
7 3.14 3.06 1.74 3.29 2.86 2.94
8 3.26 3.23 2.94 1.31 2.57 3.11
9 3.20 3.23 3.26 3.34 3.37 3.26
10 2.80 3.29 3.14 0.86 3.11 3.26
11 3.34 3.37 3.17 3.14 1.66 2.23
12 3.17 3.17 3.34 3.37 2.89 2.94
13 2.77 2.91 2.43 3 2.14 2.71
14 3.23 3.23 2.11 2.97 2.97 3.37
Average 2.76 2.79 2.51 2.84 2.81 3.01
median 2.97 3.11 2.56 3.09 2.94 3.06
Table 10. Resource losses by each quality water (treatments 1-3) due to under-exploitation
(units of recharge which did not enter the respective basin)
Resource Resource #(KL < 3) #(KH < 3) #(KL = 3) #(KH = 3)
Loss L Loss H
T1 216 189 195 200 147 157
T2 334 199 218 210 153 110
T3 225 119 180 178 92 100
Note: Symbol # notes the number of observations in which the quantity felt short of the constant
periodical recharge

